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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
vs.

Plaintiff,

I
\

LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT COUNCIL 67, WESTERN CONFERENCE
OF TEAMSTERS, THE INTERNA:. Case No.
8823
1
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF \
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al.,
Defendants . I.

PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

Come now the defendants and appellants in the above
entitled action and jointly and severally respectfully petition
the Court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause for
the reason and upon the ground that in its opinion heretofore
written the Court erred in the following particulars:
IV
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POINT I
ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS
AN INDUCEMENT OF NEUTRAL EMPLOYEES TO ACT
IN CONCERT AS REQUIRED BY SEC. 303 OF THE ACT,
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS OPINION SOLELY
ON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NO PROBATIVE VALUE AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO
OTHER EVIDENCE.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A UNIFIED OPERATION BETWEEN CACHE VALLEY DAIRY
ASSOCIATION AND PLAINTIFF AND THEREBY ALSO
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WHICH CONSISTED OF THE
"MOORE DRY DOCK" CRITERIA PERTAINING TO THE
AMBULATORY PICKETING FEATURE OF THE CASE.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ERROR
IN THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOLVEMENT OF THE ISSUE
OF CERTIFICATION IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY OVER DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION. THIS ERROR
IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS SINCE THIS COURT DOES
DECIDE THAT THE ISSUE OF CERTIFICATION HAD
NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING DEFENDANTS
OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM BY THE CONSTITUTION, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE FEDERAL
STATUTE.
POINTY
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL IS A STRANGER TO THIS
CAUSE.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS EXEMPT FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE ACT.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE
IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
BY THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A LICENSE OR
PERMIT TO CONDUCT ITS INTERSTATE HAULING
BUSINESS.
VI
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS A CONTRACT CARRIER AT THE
TIMES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY.
POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS
NOT ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. CORBETT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL.
POINT XI
THE COURT ERRED BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT
THE BOOKS OF PLAINTIFF WERE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE AND PROPERLY SO RECEIVED, AND THAT AS
SUCH TENDED TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
POINT XII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES WAS NOT SO SPECULATIVE
AS NOT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
POINT XIII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY
THE JURY THAT DORMANS REFUSED TO PURCHASE
MORE CHEESE BECAUSE OF THE PICKETING.
VII
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POINT XIV
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE A FINDING BY THE JURY
THAT THE DORMANS WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE
TO PURCHASE MORE CHEESE FROM THE PLAINTIFF.

POINT XV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

POINT XVI
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL.

We, the undersigned attorneys for the defendants herein,
certify that in our opinion there is merit to the foregoing claim
that the Court committed errors in the particulars above specified, and that a rehearing should be granted to the end that
the errors complained of be corrected.
Clarence M. Beck
A. Park Smoot
Elias Hansen

Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants
VIII
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS
AN INDUCEMENT OF NEUTRAL EMPLOYEES TO ACT
IN CONCERT AS REQUIRED BY SEC. 303 OF THE ACT,
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS OPINION SOLELY
ON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NO PROBATIVE VALUE AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO
OTHER EVIDENCE.
In reviewing the record the court, as stated in the opinion,
was to be guided by the principle that, "we must go along
with the verdict unless it clearly is not supported by any substantial evidence." We proceed with this guiding principle in
mind.
Defendants, in denying liability relied on the basic premise
that Dorman's employees were not appealed to by the picketing
or otherwise, and that the appeal had an effect only on the
employer and a supervisory employee; that the picketing necessarily could not have been an appeal to Dorman's employees,
because at the time of the picketing, there were no employees
to be appealed to and that, therefore, since there was no showing of a plurality of neutral employees, there was necessarily
no appeal for a concert of action among employees as required
by the act; and that the only work stoppage came about by the
order of the foreman, Rosen, after consulting with his employer, the Dorman brothers.
In disagreeing with defendants on this ~oint, the Court
says:
1
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"Dorman contacted Gossner in Utah and advised him
that there was a picket line in front of his place of
business picketing Dairy Distributors' trucks, advising
that his employees would not cross the picket line and
did not want to unload the cheese."
This quote is substantially the language used in respondent's brief in its statement of the facts, and this statement is
premised only upon Gassner's heresay testimony on Page 16
of the transcript wherein Gossner says:
"I got a call from New York and it was Mr. Dorman
that called and he told me that they had a picket line
in front of their plant picketing their Distributor's
truck and that his employees would not cross the picket
line and did not want to unload the cheese."
This evidence, coming into the record as it did, left defendants without any chance to cross-examine the absent
author of the statement. The mischief of such evidence is
universally recognized. Even when not objected to, in this
jurisdiction such evidence alone may not be the basis for a
finding of fact or of a judgment, as will hereinafter be seen.
In those jurisdictions where such evidence which enters the
record without objection is permitted to support a finding of
fact, the evidence is received subject to its inherent weakness
or infirmities. The infirmities of this hearsay statement are
these: if Dorman made the statement attributed to him by
Gessner, using the plural "employees," he could have been
saying it not as a statement of fact, but for its possible influence
on Gessner; it is contrary to Rosen's testimony who said that
he and Dorman alone decided not to unload; and the hearsay
statement fails to give any idea as to the number of employees. It could have meant only Rosen the Supervisor and
2
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one other, and such other person could have meant Gassner's
own employee, Mr. Schenk. (See Tr. p. 2 34 11 22-24) .
This telephone conversation between Gossner and Dorman
was objected to by Mr. Elias Hansen. The hearsay testimony
and Mr. Elias Hansen's objection and the trial court's ruling
sustaining the objection begin on Line 20, Page 16, and end
at Line 12, Page 17 of the transcript. Mr. Hansen's objection
might have been slightly tardy and the matter probably should
have been clarified by a motion to strike the hearsay testimony
above quoted, but this failure does not make the hearsay
testimony probative. It is still incompetent and may not be
used to establish defendants' liability.
That hearsay evidence alone, without other competent,
substantial evidence, cannot support a finding of fact or a
judgment is well settled in this state. The problem has arisen
more frequently in industrial compensation cases where an
interpretation of 35-1-88 U.C.A. 1953 was required. This
section provides that
·'The commission shall not be bound by the usual
common law or statutory rules of evidence * * * ."
In spite of this statutory relaxing of the rules of evidence,
"this Court has uniformly held that hearsay testimony is admissible, but just as uniformly held that a finding of fact cannot be based solely upon hearsay evidence." Ogden Iron Works
et al v. Industrial Commission et al, 102 P. 492, 132 P2d
376. See also Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 U. 103, 277 P. 206, where the Court says: "The report is hearsay evidence and it has become a well-established

3
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rule in this jurisdiction that hearsay evidence alone will not
support an award of compensation."
In Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company v. Olson,
70 Utah 95, 258 P 216, 222, 227, an attempt to establish an
agency relationship by hearsay evidence was objected to, and
when overruled by the Court an exception was not taken. This
Court in dealing with the failure to make an exception to the
trial court's ruling said:
"Although the representation that he was water
master of Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company
was not specifically excepted to, it was so obnoxious
to the.~eneral rule that we hold it to be of no probative
value.
According to the annotator at 104 ALR 1130, 1135, the
Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company ruling places Utah
in the minority view category, which view is well expressed
by the Texas Com. App. Court:
"Evidence in itself wholly incompetent and therefore without probative force, gains no vitality because
admitted without objection. It will not support a verdict
by a jury or a finding of fact by a Court." 290 S.W. 529.
A statement of the majority rule with its qualification as
to "infirmities" and then the minority rule (followed by Utah)
is found at 88 C.J.S. 299 (Trial, para. 153):
"Hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, has
been held to have probative value, and should be considered and given its natural probative effect, subject
to any infirmatit•e suggestion due to its inherent weakness, and may establish a material fact in issue, support
a finding, and sustain a verdict or judgment. However,
4
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such evidence should be given only the weight to which
it is entitled, and the failure to object adds no weight
to the evidence if intrinsically it had none. In some
jurisdictions it has been held that hearsay evidence,
although admitted without objection, is without probative force, is incompetent to establish a material fact
in issue, and will not sustain a finding or sustain a
verdict or judgment when unsupported by other evidence."
And again at 32 C.J.S. 1077 (Evidence para. 1034):
rrEvidence intrinsically destitute of probative quality
acquires no new attribute in point of weight by its production in the case. While some authorities have held
differently as to evidence admitted without objection
* * *, according to a number of authorities wholly
incompetent evidence possesses, and should be given
no probative force, and the admission of such evidence
cannot raise an issue or form the basis of a verdict,
.finding, or judgment." (Emphasis ours.)

The parts above emphasized state the view followed m
the Utah cases, supra.
Later on in the opinion, this Court in discussing the problem of appealing to employees, says this:
"As to the matter of who was induced to act, we
cannot agree with defendants that there was no evidence of any appeal or inducement directed to nonsupervisory employees to refuse to unload or handle
the plaintiff's commodities, because the union representatives talked only to the Dormans and the foreman,
Rosen."
The Court has here apparently misunderstood defendants'
position. We do not say that there was no appeal to employees
5
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because the union representatives talked only to the Dormans

and the foreman, Rosen. What we do say is that there was no
appeal to employees because there were no employees to
appeal to. Immediately following the above quotation, the
Court continues:
"To contend so it to challenge the silent potency
of a peaceful picket line, and is to ignore the very
purpose of such a line: Persuasion. It is to blind oneself to the words of the picket banner, with its pointed
suggestion that loyal union members (Dorman was a
union establishment) should not handle the cheese.
Further, it would seem to give little credit to the understanding and reaction of Dorman's union employees
by intimating that only the conversations of Rash
and the others with Dorman and Rosen, and not the
presence of or the suggestiveness of the picket banner,
had anything to do with the refusal to handle the
cheese and the subsequent demise of a profitable business."
We wish the Court to understand clearly that defendants
are not unaware of the "silent potency of a peaceful picket
line," and that the above quote indicates a misunderstanding of
defendant's position in this case. The potency of picketing is
such that it can and does influence consumers and the public in
general and this in turn may influence an employer just as readily as if his employees were the object of the picketing. It is
obvious that Dorman was also concerned about the effect the
picketing had on Ristuccia, the man he had to bargain with
as to the wages and working conditions of his employees. But
whether it was consumers, the public in general, or Ristuccia
that the Dormans were most concerned about, the effect was
immediate and they had Rosen, the foreman, delay the un·
6
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loading. Had there been no delay, the cheese would have been
unloaded by Rosen and Schenk, Gassner's driver, at about
7:00 a.m., before anyone else was there to unload. The picketing started about 7:00 a.m. or before and lasted for about
one hour, during which no employees were present other than
the supervisory employee, Rosen. (See Tr. 234-6).

If we eliminate the legally incompetent and factually
improper assumption that the picket had an influence upon
Dorman's employees, the two immediately preceding quotations
of the Court are without significance, and we respectfully request the Court to re-examine the record in the light of this
effort of defendants to bring clarification to the Court concerning their position on the vital issue of liability.
Next, we observe the following from the Court's decision:
"The cold facts are that after enjoying congenial
and profitable business relations with Dormans for
more than two years with deliveries of cheese at least
once a week, the first picket by the union agents ended
all that," etc.
We submit that liability does not rest on the fact that
Gassner went out of the trucking business a short time subsequent to the picketing. Liability must rest, if at all, upon an
appeal "to the employees of any employer to engage in a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment." Even though the picketing did influence the Dormans
and their foreman Rosen, and even if plaintiffs were successful
in showing such to be the cause of the cessation of the business
of Dairy Distributors, Inc., the defendants would still not
be liable for the loss, for such activity is within lawful bounds.
7
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On the point, however, of what actually caused Gossner
to shut down his trucking operation, we would like to call
the Court's attention to the only reason for so doing, as revealed
by the record: Gassner's Dairy Distributors, Inc., was not
enjoying "profitable business relations" with anyone, but instead was losing money in an economic activity for which he
was neither trained, adequated equipped, nor licensed.
On pages 2 39-240 of the transcript is the undisputed
testimony of Schenk that Gossner had admitted as of April,
19 55 (three months prior to the picketing) that he was losing
money in the trucking operation.
This testimony is entirely supported by plaintiff's exhibit
No. 3 at Page 4, where there is shown that of gross sales
amounting to more than one million dollars ($1,056,048.20)
during the year ending September 30, 195 5, a net profit before
taxes amounted to only $10,675.53. In examining the list of
expenses for that fiscal year, there is no expense for managing
the operation, nor are there any commissions paid for making
the sales. How much should be paid a president and manager
of a corporation which is enjoying a million dollar a year
business? How much should be paid a man or men who sell
a million dollars worth of various products~eese going one
way and various items on the back haul? The payment of even
a ridiculously low percentage of 1% for either of these functions would wipe out the entire profit. And if both services
are paid for at only 1%, then a serious loss is being suffered,
and what Gossner told Schenk in April of 195 5 is completely
in harmony therewith. But even if we don't allow any expense
for these essential items which Gossner failed to list, and
8
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assuming it to be legally proper to accept this particular list
of expenses without question, we ask: What kind of law is it
that permits a jury to speculate that there will be a future
profit of $1,000.00 a month for more than eight years when
the past percentage of profit on a million dollar gross business
amounts to only 1% before taxes? Operating on such a razorslim margin, it appears obvious that a failure to pick up one
or two back hauls, a slight miscalculation on price either in
the buying or the selling of any of the articles handled, or
experiencing any one of a great variety of probable economic
adversities, and Gossner' s Dairy Distributors, Inc., would be
losing money. Do not the foregoing considerations explain
why Gossner stopped the business rather than make whatever
adjustments an hour or so of peaceful picketing might have
suggested? In this connection, we again refer the Court to
Victor Dorman's testimony (Tr. 298-299) that if the plaintiff,
Dairy Distributors, Inc., had continued to send cheese to the
New York docks, Dormans would have continued to accept it
which fact alone necessarily eliminates plaintiff's claims for
damages, because its claim hinges on the false assumption that
Dormans would not accept cheese delivered by the plaintiff.
In view of the above, we respectfully request the Court
to observe the prejudice against the defendants in the minds
of the jurors which the large amount of the judgment necessarily suggests. We urge upon the Court that the amount of
the judgment was not only grossly excessive, but that any
amount is totally void of support in the record. The selfserving statement of Gossner that the company was making
about $1,000.00 per month is contrary to all the facts in this
case including those which are apparent from an analysis of
9
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plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 which is, as far as this record is concerned, plaintiffs primary and best evidence to support its
claim for damages. Who can read this record and fairly conclude therefrom that Gossner really abandoned a one thousand
dollar ($1,000.00) a month profit because his truck was picketed? The last thing that would ever enter Gossner' s mind
would be to abandon a fight with labor if labor threatened to
cut him out of a profit. And is it not a reasonable conclusion
from a careful study of the record that as soon as Gossner
learned of the picketing, he saw his chance to abandon an
unprofitable business and to blame the whole thing on his old
antagonist, the union?
Motivated as Gossner was against the union, it is probable
that he was possessed of a stronger motivation: that of making
a profit. And if his trucking business at this juncture were in
a condition to be made a financial success, contrary to the aforementioned evidence, it is reasonable to suppose that Gossner
would have done what he could to minimize the "damage"
supposedly being caused by the picketing. And if we are wrong
in this assumption, then the only alternate conclusion is that
he failed to do what was available for him to do in eliminating,
or, at the very least, minimizing the damage. Since he continued to refuse either to bargain with the union, or, in lieu
thereof, to ask for an injunction-which he had a right to do
if there is any merit to his claim-then he loses his right to
any damage because he did not do what he could have done
to eliminate, or, at the least, to minimize the damage.
The Court's opinion adds:
"It is difficult to understand why the union would
10
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engage in this picketing if it were not designed to
appeal to and influence the employees."
We submit that whether we understand why the union
picketed is, by itself, not an issue in this case. Until the plaintiff makes out its case on the point that there were employees
who were induced to act in concert, this Court has no legally
valid concern with the object of the picketing. Even so, appellants in their oral argument before the Court and in their
reply brief (page 22) gave what we believe to be good and
valid reasons for the picketing even though there were no
employees to be influenced by it.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A UNIFIED OPERATION BETWEEN CACHE VALLEY DAIRY
ASSOCIATION AND PLAINTIFF AND THEREBY ALSO
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WHICH CONSISTED OF THE
"MOORE DRY DOCK" CRITERIA PERTAINING TO THE
AMBULATORY PICKETING FEATURE OF THE CASE.
Without giving us the benefit of its analysis on this point,
the Court simply says:
"The concession of defendants that the Association
and the plaintiff corporation were independent organizations * * * disposes of any necessity to discuss ambulatory picketing and alter ego matters * * * ."
But the facts in this case present a unity of operations
situation between the plaintiff and the Association, even
11
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though legally separated, which cannot properly be dismissed
so lightly, nor at all. This is because Gassner had complete
control of the hiring, firing, managing of, and policy-making
concerning the employees of both the cheese processing operation, through his contract (Exhibit 19) with the Association,
and the hauling of that cheese through the Dairy Distributors,
Inc., and he controlled and managed the Company, including
the employees. (See Schenk's testimony, Tr. pp 240-241).
That he alone also controlled and managed the employees
and ran the entire cheese-making process is obvious from an
examination of page 8 of the transcript and Exhibit 19, which
is a contract between Cache Valley Dairy Association and
Edwin Gossner, under which Gossner had the entire and
complete and exclusive use and control of the cheese-making
equipment and facilities. The contract specifically gives Gossner
sole and exclusive responsibility to hire, control, direct and
fire his own employees. All cheese-making employees were
Gassner's employees and not the employees of the Cache Valley
Dairy Association. Although the plant facilities were owned
by the Association, the Association had nothing at all to do
with the cheese-making process. Nor did it have anything to
do with the marketing of the cheese, which was Gassner's
exclusive right and responsibility. All that the Association
members did was to deliver the milk for processing and receive
their pro rata share of 85% of the gross income from Grossner's
marketing operations. The dairy farmers of the co-op may have
employed farm hands to help produce the milk, but that was
each farmer's individual problem and such employees have
never been involved in any employee-employer relationship of
the Association. The only employees involved in the Associa12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion's history of labor trouble have been Gassner's employees.
The farmers, in their associated capacity, had no employees,
at least there are none so far as the record shows. While the
cooperative association of farmers was named Cache Valley
Dairy Association, it was also a fact (and this is a very important distinction which may not have been sufficiently observed by the Court) that Gassner's own cheese-processing
operation which was his and his alone was also known as,
and called, Cache Valley Dairy Association. Unless this distinction is recognized our point here will not be understood.
That Gassner's cheese-processing operation was also called
Cache Valley Dairy Association by Gassner himself, as well
as those who did business with him, is evident from pages
8 and 9 of the transcript and is implicit in the contract itself,
especially when read in connection with the transcript. It is
further evident from the use of the name Cache Valley Dairy
Association used in the billings which Gassner, as cheese maker
and marketer sent to Dorman (Tr. 290-295). And it is further
evident from a study of Exhibit 4, the letter of August 22, from
Victor Dorman to Ed Gassner. This letter is addressed to
"Cache Valley Dairy Association, Smithfield, Utah, Dear Ed."
This letter incidentally was offered in evidence by plaintiff (Tr. 99). Defendants objected because it was hearsay.
Finding the Court still of a mind to consider the matter, a
further objection was made that Exhibit 4 was not addressed
to the plaintiff, Dairy Distributors, Inc. Since plaintiff was
introducing the letter as one sent to the plaintiff, Dairy Distributors, Inc., it appears obvious that during the trial, Gassner,
in the mind of his own counsel, was both Dairy Distributors,
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Inc., and Cache Valley Dairy Association. This is quite understandable in view of all the facts.
In appellants' reply brief, we cited some Board cases to
show that a set of facts such as we have in this case necessarily
points to a unified operation. A recent decision of the U. S.
Court of Appeals (First Circuit) further amplifies our position.
The case is J. G. Roy and Sons Company v. National Labor
Relations Board, January 27, 1958, 41 LRRM 2445, 251 F2d
771. Under the facts of the case the Board had, on the basis
only of substantial common ownership of the two companies involved, ruled it to be a unified operation. But the
Appeal Court, after reviewing the history of the cases on the
subject decided that the Roy case did not meet the most essential requirement of the "ally" doctrine because "it was specifically found that there was no actual common control over
labor policies or over any other phase of the operations of Roy
Lumber and Roy Construction." In reviewing the cases and
pointing up the essentials of the "ally" doctrine, the Court says:
"An analysis of the citations relied upon by the Board
in support of its contention that two separate corporate
entities may be regarded as one employer fully supports
our conclusion that such a finding in the instant case
is unwarranted. In Labor Board v. Stowe Spinning Co.,
336 U.S. 226, 23 LRRM 2371 (1949), the hall, which
the four corporations unfairly refused the use of to
the union for organizational purposes, was owned by
those corporations jointly and was managed by an agent
of the four corporations. See National Labor Relations
Board v. Stowe Spinning Company, 165 F. 2d 609,
610, 21 LRRM 2174 ( 4 Cir. 1947), reversed supra.
It was clear that each of these four corporations had
the same labor policy and they were as one enterprise,
14
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especially with regard to the hall which was the subject of the unfair labor practices. In National Labor
Relations Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67,
10 LRRM 483 (3 Cir. 1942), one employer was the
wholly owned subsidiary of the other from whom it
purchased materials at cost, which were later sold back
again after certain manufacturing operations also at
cost. The court held that what was important was the
* * * degree of control over the labor relations in
issue * * * ," supra at 71. Similarly in National Labor
Relations Board v. Somerset Classics, 193 F.2d 613,
29 LRRM 2331 (2 Cir. 1952), cert. denied sub nom,
Modern Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. National Labor
Relations Board et al., 344 U.S. 816, 30 LRRM 2711,
while the two corporations were owned and controlled
by members of the same family, there was the additional evidence that one corporation was entirely dependent upon the other corporation for its work, the
operations of both companies was closely integrated
and the same individual was managing both companies
during the period when the unfair labor practice occurred. These elements of common management integrated operations and complete dependence by one
company upon the other for its work were also present
in National Labor Relations Board v. National Garment Co., 166 F.2d 233, 21 LRRM 2215 (8 Cir. 1948)
cert. denied 334 U.S. 845, 22 LRRM 2189. In National
Labor Rel. Board v. Federal Engineering Co., 153
F.2d 233, 17 LRRM 792 ( 6 Cir. 1946), there was
abundant evidence that the two legal entities, a corporation and partnership, were engaged in one enterprise. Three of the four partners were top officials
of the corporation, which owned the plant where the
common enterprise was conducted and whose affairs
were interrelated and intertwined with those of the
partnership."
In distinguishing the Roy case from the Irwin-Lyons
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Lumber Co. case (25 LRRM 1092) which appellants cited in
their reply brief the Appeals Court said:
"The Board's 'straight line operation' doctrine is
derived from its own decision in National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber
Co.), 87 NLRB 54, 25 LRRM 1092 (1949). In that
case the primary employer was engaged in lobbying
operations while the secondary employer transported all
of the logs from the primary employer's logging site
to its sawmill. Both employers were commonly owned,
and, unlike the instant case, the president and active
operating head of both companies was the same man.
The secondary employer's operations were an absolutely essential and integral part of the primary employer's enterprise."
Because the facts of common control of the labor of the
two companies in the case now before the Court, and because
of their integration generally we believe that it is inescapable
that this Court has committed error by not finding a unified
or allied operation between the two companies in question
and we, therefore, respectfully request this Court to reconsider
this aspect of the case and render an opinion in harmony with
the facts of this case and of the cases cited herein and in our
briefs heretofore submitted.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ERROR
IN THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOLVEMENT OF THE ISSUE
OF CERTIFICATION IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY OVER DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION. THIS ERROR
IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS SINCE THIS COURT DOES
16
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DECIDE THAT THE ISSUE OF CERTIFICATION HAD
NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE.
Concerning the problem, the Court says:
"To argue that certification or its equivalent had
something to do with this case would be to assume that
the Association, not the plaintiff, delivered the cheese
to Dorman's in New York."
The Court here agrees with us that certification has nothing
to do with this case. We differ, however, as to the reasons for
it. If the Court, after reconsidering the allied operations of
the plaintiff and the Association, decides that it makes no
difference which of these two companies delivered the cheese
to Dormans in New York, and from such decides that certification, after all, is involved in the case, we then respectfully
urge upon the Court that it review our position as to why
certification is not involved, and further, to consider our
position that if it is involved, that the Trial Court erred when,
in instruction 5d, in quoting Section 303 (a) ( 2) it omitted
the following qualification: "under the provisions of Section
9 of the N.L.R.A." By such omission defendants were precluded from arguing to the jury that they were in an equivalent status to a formal certification. We have observed that
this Court says "we are not convinced by the arguments of
counsel for defendants relating to an equivalence of certification" because the employees which the union represented
were no longer members of the union. Of course, if certification is not a problem in the case, then it makes no difference
whether there was an equivalence of certification. But if, upon
a reconsideration, this question does become important we
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wish to urge upon the Court our former arguments which are:
( 1) That an equivalence of certification is determined by the
rules of 9 (c) of the Act which as applied to the facts of this
case preclude as pertinent the facts which have influenced this
Court. ( 2) That the Board itself ordered Gossner to bargain
with Defendant Local 976 and nothing was ever done, either
by Gossner or his employees, to change that Order.
We wish to remind the Court that the only reason defendants argued the certification matter at all was because the
plaintiffs and the trial court decided over our objection that
it was pertinent to the case. But in giving an instruction about
certification the trial Court erred in omitting the abovementioned qualification to the instruction it did give, which
very much prejudiced defendants' position before the jury.
In simple language the trial Court said in effect, "A labor
union that is not certified is liable. Defendants are not certified,
so they are liable." The jury was thus practically directed to
bring in a verdict of liability. As the Court's opinion now
stands, however, we are not a little confused and alarmed that
this Court should take the trouble to specify three reasons for
disagreeing with our arguments about certification, then proceed to say that the Court agrees with us that this issue has no
business in the case anyway. The final irony, however, is that
after saying that the issue of certification has no business in
the case, this Court fails to find prejudicial error in the trial
Court's involvement of the issue of certification in the instructions to the jury. (See Instructions 2 (b), 5-l (b), and
5 (d)).
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING DEFENDANTS
OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM BY THE CONSTITUTION, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE FEDERAL
STATUTE.
In view of the Court's failure to agree with any of defendants' points on the problem of liability, it seems essential
that we say something about the rights which these defendants
are given by the U. S. Constitution, the common law, and
the Taft Act in the hope that the Court may, from a better
vantage point, see what we believe to be errors in its opinion.
The Taft Act specifically gives a union the right to publicize a grievance. Paragraph 8 (c) reads:
"The expressing of any views, arguments or opinions
or the dissemination thereof whether in written, printed,
graphic or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this Act if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.''
A traditional and oft used means of expressing a union's
view is by a picket sign. Picketing is usually the particular
means employed to disseminate a union's point of view during
a strike.
Section 13 of the Act recognizes and allows the right of a
union to strike (or picket) . It reads:
"Sec. 13. Nothing in this act except as specifically
provided for herein shall be construed either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications
on that right."
19
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The United States Supreme Court in the case of NLRB
vs. International Rice Milling Company, 341 U.S. 665, 28
LLRM 2195, in interpreting Section 13, equates picketing
with striking. In that case a union, although not certified or
recognized as the representative of the employees of a certain
mill, picketed the mill with the object of securing recognition
of the union as the collective bargaining agent of the milJ
employees. The "strike" was, therefore, nothing more than
the picketing for recognition by a union whose members did
not include employees of the employer who was being picketed.
It was "stranger picketing" and there appears to have been
no work stoppage. The Supreme Court bases its opinion in part
on Section 13, which it quotes, and then says:
"By Paragraph 13, Congress made it clear that 8(b)
( 4) , and all other parts of the Act which otherwise
might be read so as to interfere with, impede, or diminish the union's traditional right to strike, may be so
read only if such interference, impediment or diminution is 'specifically provided for' in the Act. No such
specific provision in 8(b) ( 4) reaches the incident here.
The material legislative history supports this view."
It is thus obvious that the Supreme Court recognizes that
the word "strike" in Section 13 includes the word "picket"
and as the facts of Rice Milling clearly establishes, this right
to picket is not restricted to those employees who are picketing
only their own employer. The Anti Injunction Act of 1932
(Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, specifically Sees. 104(3)
and 113 (c) ) and the Taft-Hartley Act (Sections 2 ( 3) and
2(9)) and its predecessor, the Wagner Act, have for many
years established this principle as part of a national labor
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policy, which in turn was a statutory adoption of Court established law.
The Courts have long recognized that the very existence
of trade unions depends on the right to publicize a dispute
beyond the situs of a single employer-employee relationship
and to extend the same to various sites of an entire trade or
industry in an economically contiguous area. In briefly touching on this point we preface the same by referring to an error
of the trial court in excluding some evidence proffered by
defendants. Mr. Ballew had testified generally that the wages
paid by Gossner in his cheese operation were lower than
wages paid for similar work in the same competitive area
(Tr. 306); and then when defendants offered to prove in
specific cases where cheese was produced in Northern Utah
and Southern Idaho that the wage rates were substantially
higher in such plants than the wages being paid by Gossner,
the Court sustained plaintiff's objection to such evidence
(Tr. 331-332). This, we say, was error because it prevented
defendants from disputing Mr. Thoresen's testimony on the
subject (Tr. 179), and also prevented defendants from establishing the wage differential as a premise for arguing to the
jury an important objective of the picketing which was to
eliminate the substandard wages and working conditions in
the area. That the union had the right to peacefully picket
Gossner at his plant (or his trucks which handled the cheese
wherever his trucks came to rest as we have elsewhere argued),
and regardless of whether his employees were in good standing
in, or even members of, the union is well stated by Chief
Justice Taft in American Steel Foundaries vs. Tri-Cities Central
Trades Council et al, 257 U. S. 184-209,
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"Employees must make their combination extend
beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as many as may
be in the same trade in the community united, because
in the competition between employees, they are bound
to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade
in the neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all
lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership and
especially among those whose labor at lower wages
will injure their whole guild."
In Apex Hosiery Company vs. Leader, 310 U. S. 469,
Justice Stone restated the proposition as follows (at Page 503) :
"Furthermore, successful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage agreement with employers, may have some influence on price competition
by eliminating that part of such competition which
is based on differences in labor standards. Since, in
order to render a labor combination effective it must
eliminate the competition from non-union made goods,
an elimination of price competition based on differences
in labor standards is the objective of any national labor
organization."
More lately, in American Federation of Labor vs. Swing,
312 U.S. 321, at 326, the Court stated:
"A state cannot exclude working men from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by
drawing the circle of economic competition between
employers and workers so small as to contain only an
employer and those directly employed by him. The
inter-dependence of economic interest of all engaged
in the same industry has become a commonplace."
A classic expression of the principle is contained in the
often-quoted decision of Judge Andrews in Exchange Bakery
vs. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, at 263; 157 N.E. 130, at 132:
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"The purpose of a labor union to improve the conditions under which its members do their work . . .
may justify what would otherwise be a wrong. So
would an effort to increase its members and to unionize
an entire trade or business . . . Economic organization
today is based on the single shop. Unions believe that
wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained only if union conditions prevail, not in some
single factory but generally. That they may prevail it
may call a strike and picket the premises of an employer wjth the intent of inducing him to employ only
union labor ... Resulting injury is incidental and must
be endured."
There are three very recent cases to the same effect from
the states of Tennessee, Colorado and Arizona: Pueblo Building Trades Council vs. Harper Company, 39 LLRM 2398;
L. A. Flat, Complainant, vs. Barbers' Union, defendant, 39
LRRM 2585 and International Brotherhood of Carpenters
Local 857 et al vs. Todd L. Storms Construction Company, 42
LRRM 2116.
Independent of the foregoing sources of labor's right to
peacefully communicate its messages to others, is its right of
free speech in the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; AFL vs. Swing,
312 U. S. 321). While the U. S. Supreme Court has given
more weight in intra-state jurisdictional cases to certain other
rights growing out of state declared public policy (Teamster
Local vs. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 40 LLRM 2208), the
Court, in interstate cases, having there not "retreated" (using
the expression in the dissent of Justice Douglas) as it has in
the intra-state field, has been careful to preserve this basic
means of labor to further its economic self interest because the
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Taft Act is not so restrictive as the law in many of the states,
nor as restrictive as some Courts have thought it to be, as will
be seen in the recent "Sand Door Case" hereinafter considered.
But first, we wish to emphasize that any restrictions upon
picketing intended by Congress in the Taft Act were limited
and specific, and in no sense involved a repeal of labor's basic
right to picket. Obviously, to avoid and prevent a too-easy
invasion of these rights, Congress spelled them out in Sections
2(3), 2(9), 8(c) and 13. These sections make it clear that
labor's long established right to picket shall not be invaded
unless otherwise specifically provided. The exceptions are
stated explicitly and can be pinpointed. As to such, it should
be required of plaintiff to offer substantial evidence. This,
plaintiff has failed to do. But in the confusion of a complicated case, the defendants have been stripped of their rights
by nothing more than incompetent, self-serving, hearsay testimony full of infirmities, and without probative value.
The principle that the rights reserved to unions are not
to be diminished except as specifically provided by the Act
has recently been treated again by the U. S. Supreme Court
in an opinion which applied to three cases before the Court,
each requiring an interpretation of "hot cargo" clauses in collective bargaining agreements when an 8 (b) ( 4) violation
was involved, the question being: was such a clause a defense
to an 8 (b) ( 4) violation? Since there has been so much judicial
expression which has appeared to equate 8 (b) ( 4) with a
general, all inclusive, definition of secondary boycott, the
Court, in defining the limited area which the Act proscribes,
says:
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"Whatever may have been said in Congress preceding
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act concerning the
evil of all forms of 'secondary boycotts' and the desirability of outlawing them, it is clear that no such
sweeping prohibition was in fact enacted in 8 (b) ( 4)(A). The section does not speak generally of secondary
boycotts. It describes and condemns specific union
conduct directed to specific objectives. It makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to induce employees
to strike against or to refuse to handle goods for their
employer when an object is to force him or another
person to cease doing business with some third party.
Employees must be induced; they must be induced to
engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must
be to force or require their employer or another person
to cease doing business with a third person. Thus,
much that might argumentatively be found to fall
within the broad and somewhat vague concept of secondary boycott is not in terms prohibited. A boycott
voluntarily engaged in by a secondary employer for his
own business reasons, perhaps because the unionization of other employers will protect his competitive
position or because he identifies his own interest with
those of his employees and their union, is not covered
by the statute. Likewise, a union is free to approach
an employer to persuade him to engage in a boycott,
so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited
means of coercion through inducement of employees."
Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, June 16, 1958 (Sand
Door and Plywood Co.) Sup. Ct. of the U. S., 42
LRRM 2243.
To summarize, defendants have been given by Congress
the right to peaceably express their views by picketing or otherwise, in any way they choose, except as such activity comes
within certain specific restrictions; and unless their conduct
comes within the specific limitations, this right is not affected,
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even if, in the exercise thereof, it should result in economic harm
to other employers or the public in general. The only limitation
to this right, so far as this case is concerned, is that by such expressions the defendants may not ( 1) induce employees of an
employer, ( 2) to concertedly refuse to handle goods of their
employer, ( 3) if an object thereof is to force the employer
not to do business with any other employer. Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes it clear that until ( 1) above is established, there
is no need to consider ( 2) or ( 3) . Since ( 1) is not established
for the reasons heretofore argued, we ask this Court to restore
to the defendants their rights reserved to them by the Act.
We offer one final word on the points herein discussed.
We do not contend that the picketing was motivated only
because the lower wage rates being paid by Gossner were
tending to depress wage rates elsewhere in the economic area
involved. We have referred to other reasons in connection
with the New York picketing. But there is still another
reason, implicit in the record, but so far perhaps without
explicit expression. It is this: that for two years following the
Board's order to Gossner to bargain with the union he, nevertheless, refused to do so. The result was that Gossner' s employees stopped paying their union dues, and there was, therefore, talk of membership suspension. For the same reason,
the picket sign read: "Non-union employees." This was the
inevitable and precise result which Gossner would naturally
expect (and hope) from his failure to follow the Board's order.
What else could the union do to protect itself and those
whom it represented in the area but to fight back and
use the economic means which the Constitution, the Courts
and Congress had provided ? If ever there existed moral or

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

economic justification in a labor dispute for picketing to protest
the unfair conduct of an employer, it existed here in the union's
effort to overcome Gassner's adamancy to bargain and his
violation of a Board order to bargain with this union, and to
regain the position with Gassner's employees which the union
once had, and which it is reasonable to expect it would have
continued to have, but for its inability to get Gassner to do
what the Board had ordered him to do.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL IS A STRANGER TO THIS
CAUSE.
We believe we failed to make our position clear in this
respect, perhaps because of our over-confidence, or over-simplification or our inability to adequately express ourselves. However, we are so convinced respecting this ground which the
trial Court raised (Tr. 341), that we therefore approach
the question from a different direction. We invite the Court's
attention to the first and basic pleading, the complaint herein,
which is the same now as it was at the beginning of the law
suit-not a word has been changed or amended.
Nowhere in the complaint do the words International
appear except by reference to the caption. Nowhere in the
complaint does it appear that the International is a labor union
or a corporation or a partnership. Nowhere in the complaint,
and this is of great relative importance, does the word "agency"
or "agent" appear, or that the International has agents. No27
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where in the complaint does even a remote suggestion appear
that the complaint embraces other than a pure, pristine, common-law action for malicious conspiracy on the part of this
defendant. No federal act is referred to in the complaint. The
complaint is silent respecting the words Taft-Hartley or Labor
Management Relations Act or any other Federal Act. State
court jurisdiction rather than federal jurisdiction was chosen.
Whereas, on the other hand, there looms in big neon a demand
for $50,000.00 for punitive damages against three joint individual defendants as well as this defendant as joint conspirators.
Quite plainly, the Federal Act never entered the mind of the
scrivener of such pleading, or if it did, it carried no freight
on his train of thought, for it is elementary that the Federal
Labor Act permits no such suit for punitive damages nor does
it permit such suits to stand against individual defendants.
Obviously, the complaint on its face pleads facts which
oust and supercede the state court of its jurisdiction while on
the other hand the complaint sets forth facts which squarely
vest such jurisdiction exclusively within the NLRB because
and by reason of the fact that it alleges certain tractor-trailers
were purchased for the purpose of transporting cheese and
other types of merchandise in interstate commerce; but nowhere in the complaint does it allege the essential and necessary
authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission to so
transport such freight in interstate commerce. After the International had vigorously protested the service of process and
jointly filed a motion to dismiss and made a rather convincing
argument that the complaint stated a perfect case of Board
jurisdiction; that such state court jurisdiction had been superseded by the Congress of the United States; then and at that
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time, plaintiff made no attempt to dismiss its demand for
punitive damages or its demand for judgment against the individual defendants, but it did come forward with a rather
unusual contention in such circumstances that the complaint
pleaded a cause under the LMRA and its allegations were so
intended.
When the first labor act was enacted by Congress in 1935
and again when it was overhauled in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Amendment, the fundamental principles were not touched
or trenched upon but basically remain the same to this daythat is to say, employees have the legal right to act together
for their mutual aid or protection and this is the heart of our
federal law now.
We therefore find ourselves limited exclusively within the
four corners of the LMRA hereinafter called the Act for both
our adjective and substantive law which here control. The
plaintiff must first prove five essential elements by a fair preponderance of the evidence before it may prevail, ( 1) it must
prove that the International is the type and class of organization defined in the Act, ( 2) that defendant's agents committed
the tort complained of, ( 3) that such agents were authorized,
( 4) that such agents acted within the scope of their employment, ( 5) that the process so served was served upon a labor
organization defined in the Act, while at the very time such
agent or officer was acting in his capacity as such officer or
agent-and in this respect service under the law of the forum
is more restrictive.
The Evidence Excludes the International From the Act
Pursuant to Section 303 (a) of the Act, plaintiff must
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prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the International is a particular type of labor organization, one that
does not fall into the classification of a state federation of
labor, or a city federation of labor or the usual national federation. It must be a labor organization that bargains, similar
to a local or joint council or to a United Mine Workers monolithic or district type of organization. The definition of labor
organization in the Act was expressly and intentionally limited;
otherwise, the various chambers of commerce, luncheon clubs,
state and city federations of labor would be included, because
they daily deal with labor relations problems. But they do not
bargain-employers do not participate and bargain with employees. Such organizations are exempt and exactly the same
pattern follows in Section 2 ( 2) of the Act where bank, hospital, railroad and state employers are excluded and in Section
3 ( 2) of the Act where domestic, agricuture and certain railway, etc., employees are excluded.
The fact that it would have been heedless, needless and
stupid for the International to step out of its traditional function and inject itself into a purely petty local situation or
horn in on joint council organization ventures over which it
could not control and did not control or that the International
with a mere handful of officers and representatives would be
helpless to take a hand in the bargaining of more than 1000
locals and 70 joint councils whose exclusive business is bargaining, may be lightly ridden ov~r. Nevertheless, there is not
a hint in the complaint or an iota of evidence in the record that
the International is a labor union as defined in the Act or that
it can or does bargain wherein employers or employees participate, while on the other hand, an affirmative assumption
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arose that employers may not, can not and do not participate
respecting such bargaining.
Agency Is Not Allowed or Proven on the Part of the
International

Perhaps because the word "agent" is not found in the complaint and "agency" is not alleged in the complaint respecting
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and that the
plaintiff apparently made no effort to prove agency on the part
of the International, we may have been induced to take too
much for granted, and oversimplify our position. That Lott
and Rash were both agents and trustees of the Joint Council
and Ballew, an employee of the W>stern States Dairy Council
and on temporary loan and that the Joint Council was the
sole and only picketing entity, accounts perfectly for the motives, purposes and agency of these men during their two brief
appearances on the picket line. Neither of these men drew any
salary, wage or commission from or were connected with the
International or under its orders. Aside from it being a senseless and useless thing, there was no occasion for the International to horn in on the grievance.
Where our adversaries become detoured is in persuading
this Court to be impressed by and quote from the San Francisco
Longshoremen's case, 226 Fed. 875. That case does not treat
or dispose of the point we here discuss. The case squares entirely
with our view. The precipitate and central point of that case
was "scope," that is to say, after the party asserting agency as
a first essential to the establishing of the fact of agency then
such party has the burden of proving the second essential, towit: that the agent's particular activity was within the "scope"
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of that agency and the Court properly held in the Longshoremen's case that when an International union puts an officer
into a position where he violates the Act, then, and in such
event, the International union is liable for the legal consequences, but that is a far cry from the fact and applicable law
we have here under consideration. In the instant case, the
defendant proved that Lott, Rash and Ballew were not employees or agents of the International, notwithstanding the
burden of so proving was upon the plaintiff. The record here
is absolutely silent respecting the second essential, namely,
scope; whereas, in the Longshoremen's case, a smallish International, Meehan and Goldblat were the established officers
and agents of the Longshoremen's International and very
obviously engaged in a sequence and continuity of activity
directed and supervised by the Longshoremen's International.
The Court peremptorily instructed the jury on the fact but there
is no showing or admission, and, of course, no instruction in
the case at bar that Lott, Rash and Ballew were agents of the
Teamster International or that such International could or
would be interested even from an observation standpoint in a
parochial and at that time a small grievance.
There simply was no issue of fact respecting agency
treated in the Longshoreman's case; agency was no problem.
The International officer who triggered, implemented, and
managed the entire operation in the Longshoremen's case was
directly and definitely a representative and an agent of the
International. The portion of that case the Utah Court quotes
and refers to is a part of the Court's decision respecting strictly
the issue of "scope" raised in the following instruction which
appears in the same column and page.
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"The evidence shows that during the time covered
by the controversy Louis Goldblatt \Vas an officer and
:Matt Meehan, \Villiam Gettings, Henry Schmidt and
Eoward Bodine were agents and representatives of
the Defendant International, and that Robert Baker
and \Vilfred 1\:Iackey were officers, and that Toby Christiansen and Matt Nleehan were agents and representatives of Defendant Local 8. It is for you to say whether
what they did, if anything, in committing or assisting
in the commission of the acts charged, or any of them,
or in entertaining any objects or purposes, if you find
that such acts were committed or that such objects were
entertained, was within the scope of their employment."
(Emphasis ours.)
Of course, as the Circuit Court says, there is precious
little case law on agency features of Section 301 of the Act.
That is to be expected because only on rare occasions could and
would it arise that an agent would deny the identity of his
principle or his employer or under whose directions he worked,
while on the other hand, the question of the scope of the
agent's employment frequently arises, especially as it did in
the field of master and servant law prior to the advent of the
Workmen's Compensation Act when a goodly portion of this
Court's attention was devoted to the question of whether an
agent was acting within the scope of his employment when the
careless act complained of arose.
The same miscomprehension ensues when our adversaries
cite, and this Court quotes from the case of United Mine
Workers vs. Patton, 211 Fed. 2nd 742; in that case the Clinchfield Coal Corporation were encountering an argument from
the District organization of United Mine Workers because its
small truck mines were operating both union and non-union
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and when Patton's truck lease was revoked, he asked the
Company what to do and the Company advised Patton to get
in touch with the field representative of District 28 (the organizing arm of the United Mine Workers), which he did
and thereupon entered into a full union shop agreement with
said field agent. Thereafter Patton asked the lessor whether
they would have to operate union and was told by the Company
that Patton should decide that matter for himself. Whereupon Patton decided to repudiate his union agreement with
the United Mine Workers field representative and go openshop and non-union. Following this turn-about on the part of
Patton, the other truck mines operating on lease from the
Clinchfield Coal Corporation decided also to ignore the union
and operate non-union and open-shop. Consequently, the
entire operation was struck by the district organization field
agent which, of course, included the operations of the big
operator and lessor, the Clinchfield Coal Corporation. The
strike lasted a week but work was resumed at Clinchfield
operations under a threat from District 28 that if the recently
open-shop operated truck mines commenced mining again
non-union and open-shop, then in that event the whole operation would be struck again within a week. Thereupon the
Clinchfield Coal Corporation notified Patton that because his
lease had not been executed and signed, he should cease operation. Thereafter, Patton filed suit against the United Mine
Workers and recovered damages. The judgment, however,
was reversed on appeal, but not on the question of agency.
Obviously the fact of agency on the part of the field representative could not and did not arise because the United Mine
Workers under its particular method of organization was doing
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the on-the-spot organizing under the so-called John L. Lewis
District 50 plan, hence the field agent negotiated the labor
union contract with Patton (which Patton repudiated), called
the strike off and made the threats against the Clinchfield Coal
Corporation. The fact of agency was assumed and admitted
but the appellant raised the question of "scope" of agency,
not the fact of agency; that Patton did not produce adequate
proof that the appellant ratified or specifically authorized its
field representative to call off and on the strike. Other than
the damage element, the central point of the case is clear. It
is set out by the Court in the case at bar in its decision quoting
the Fourth Circuit Court decision.
"The chief argument of defendants in support of
their motion for directed verdict is that there is no
evidence that they authorized or ratified the strikes upon
which plaintiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there
is no evidence of any resolution of either the United
Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or ratifying
the strikes. There is evidence, however, that the strikes
were called by the Field Representative of the United
Mine Workers, who was employed by District 28, and
that he was engaged in the organization work that was
being carried on by the international union through
District 28, which was a mere division of the international union. Members of the union are members of
local and district unions as well as the international;
and of the $4.00 monthly dues paid by them, $2.00
goes to the international union, $1.00 to the local union
and $1.00 to the district organization. It is clear that
in carrying on organizational work the field representative is engaged in the business of both the international union and the district and that both are responsible for acts done by him within the scope and
course of his employment."
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It will be readily observed from the above instruction
that the fact of agency as so infrequently occurs was not an
issue but the scope of agency as frequently occurs was. Simply
stated it was-did the actual and proven field agent of the
United Mine Workers act within the "scope" of his employment; that is to say, was the strike activity of the field agent
authorized by the United Mine Workers or was it subsequently
ratified? The Court, of course, held against the mine workers
under the provisions of the Act, as it should have in our opinion
on the question of scope, but the fact of agency was no problem
and it was not raised for the reason United Mine Workers
were doing the organizing and the field agent was in the midst
of all this organizing of the truck mines when this repudiation
of contract on the part of Patton and reprisal strike occurred.
The field agent negotiated the union contract with Patton,
called the strike, made the threat, and called the strike off.

Whereas, in the instant case, an entirely different picture
and situation is presented. We grope in a factual vacuum for
any agency at all. The fact of agency is neither alleged nor
proven; in the Patton case there seems to have been an abundance of proof of fact of agency. Only scope was the issue. In
the case at bar, the Joint Council, and the Joint Council only,
on the two very brief occasions picketed the truck. The record
shows clearly and without dispute that neither of the picketeers
were on the payroll of the Teamsters International or in their
employ or in anywise connected with the Teamster International, whose business none of this was and who presumptively knew nothing about it; certainly no evidence was produced that the International knew anything about it, because
perhaps that was the fact; therefore no proof existed. The
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motives, occasion and reason for the picketeers' brief appearance at the Gossner truck are perfectly accounted for because
Rash and Lott were trustees of the defendant Joint Council
and the Joint Council was the sole and only organization to
picket and no one seems to cast even a hint contrary to thf'
fact that the Joint Council was independent of any other OI·
ganization-completely autonomous and free from influence
from any quarter. Only Mr. Gassner's obsolete trucks it seems
operated under the influence of influence.
The reason plaintiff does not allege agency we do not
know. But assuming that it did, he who alleges agency has
the burden of proving agency. Surely it would be convenient and
easy of proof-if it were true. No particular search or diligence
would be required. False records and perjury may not be
assumed, especially respecting what was then deemed a matter
of relative small consequence. Assume further that the International gave advice and counsel to Messrs. Lott, Rash and
Ballew (which it did not). To advise is not to control (Restatement of Agency, par. 1); to approve, confirm or not to
approve or confirm is not conduct that carrieswith it responsibility (ibid 82, 83, 85). This is not our conclusion but the
law of the land established by the final arbiters in such matters
-the Supreme Court of the United States. More than a quarter
century ago a case arose in which an International officer
much more clearly gave advice, guidance, direction, etc., to
a subordinate union in which the International much more
clearly, not only refused to interfere but affirmatively indicated
its approval of the subordinate's alleged wrongful activity,
which was marked by violence and unlawful conduct on the
part of the subordinate union officials and members. Yet
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there the Supreme Court twice refused to find the International
Union had thereby made such unlawful activity on the part
of the subordinate union its own activity so as to impose upon
the International responsibility for such consequences. In those
cases, the Supreme Court tested the responsibility as this Court
must test on the basis of the common-law principle of agency.
It twice concluded, speaking through Chief Justice Taft, infra,
that even this far stronger evidence of acquiescence and cooperation on the part of the International definitely did not establish
International ratification, authorization or participation of
such activity. And in our humble opinion, the Utah Supreme
Court should never be satified with less as a basis of imposing
liability on the International at bar or anyone else. The fact
that the Act provides that whether specific acts "actually
authorized or subsequently ratified" shall not be the sole and
controlling factor does not change the common-law principle
one jot or tittle and is completely to no avail in deciding
whether one person is acting in fact as the agent of another
and thus cut off then proceed to find liability upon some vague
and shadowy theory of agency scope, or authorization in the
absence of adequate proof of other factual attributes of the
agency principle. If the Court is so minded to take the time,
it will be found in the history of the Act that the United States
Congress was perplexed and dissatisfied with the opinion in
United Brotherhood of Carpenters vs. United States, 330 U.S.
395, and was more or less in agreement of the position of
Associate Justice Frankfurter in his able dissent, but this disaffection on the part of the Congress made crystal clear that
the Congress was not returning to those ancient and archaic
vestiges of rule by bench-made injunction law of forty years
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ago which have been typed as misapplication of the law of
agency to the end that the labor union was held accountable
for the conduct of mere card-carriers in whom was lodged no
authority to exercise the power of the union. We humbly and
respectfully suggest that if the decision at bar is to stand, it
will be used throughout the country in an attempt by mercenary-minded employees to return to those early decisions
whereby the laboring men and women of America were dominated and shackled and their organizations crushed. During
such era the phrase "Philadelphia lawyer" originated, because
it was he who dreamed up the highly successful union-busting
doctrine of ruin and rule by injunction.
The Court's decision in this respect is one of first impression and because it is the first and a bench mark case and
because it will tend to fix the decisions of later decisions on
the same subject matter-decisions that will determine the
course of industrial controversy and the rights of employers
and employees in the years ahead-we have thought it necessary to state our views at length concerning this matter of
such great importance. Notwithstanding, the Court's decision
involves a large claim for money damages arising under what
we believe to be suspicious and capricious circumstances,
nevertheless, its resolution may readily establish a new departure and landmark decision in the evolution of agency not
only in the field of labor relations but the entire general field
as well.
In the case of United Mine Workers of America vs. Coronado Coal Company et al, Chief Justice Taft decided:
"Communications from outsiders and editorials
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published in the United Mine V/orkers journal, giving
accounts of the occurrences at Prairie Creek, and representing that the troubles were due to the aggression
of the armed guards of the mine owners, and that the
action of the union men was justified, because in
defense of their homes against night attacks, do not
constitute such ratification by the board or the president
after the fact as to make the International Union liable
for what had been done."
"The argument of counsel for the plaintiffs is that
because the national body had authority to discipline
district organizations, to make local strikes its own,
and to pay their cost, if it deemed it wise, the duty was
thrust on it, when it knew a local strike was one, to
superintendent it and prevent its becoming lawless at
its peril. We do not conceive that such responsibility
is imposed on the national body. A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its agents in
the course of its business, and this principle is enforced
against the contention that torts are ultra vires the
corporation. But it must be shown that it is in the business of the corporation. Surely no stricter rule can be
enforced against an unincorporated organization like
this. Here it is not a question of contract or of holding
out an appearance of authority on which some third
person acts. It is a mere question of actual agency,
which the constitutions of the two bodies settle conclusively."
Coronado Coal Company vs. United Mine Workers of
America, 268 U.S. 295, a later case, Chief Justice Taft wrote:
"It does not appear that the International Convention or Executive Board ever authorized this strike or
took any part in the preparation for it or in its maintenance, or that they ratified it by paying any of the
expenses. It came within the definition of a local
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strike in the constitutions of both the national and
district organizations. The district organization made
the preparations and paid the bills. It was sought on
both trials to bring the International in by proving
that the president of the national body, John P. White.
was in Kansas City and heard of the trouble which
had taken place on April 6 at Prairie Creek, and that
he reported it to the International Board; and further
that in May he made a long speech at a special convention of District No. 21, held at Fort Smith, Arkansas, for the trial of one of its officers for corruption, in which he referred with earnest approval to
the great International Union strikes in Colorado and
West Virginia, but made no specific allusion to the
Prairie Creek difficulty. It was also argued that communications from outsiders and editorials published
in the United Mine Workers' journals giving an account
of the occurrence at Prairie Creek, and representing
that the troubles were due to the aggression of the
armed guards, and that the action of the union men
was justified in defense of their homes, expressed such
sympathy with the union men as to constitute a ratification by the International Union because the United
Mine Workers' journal was an authorized publication
of the Union."
So far as our search discloses, the latest expression upon
the subject is a United States District Court of Columbia
decision by Judge Holtzoff, decided May 28, 1958, 42 LLRM,
Page 2169, which holds:
"The mere fact, however, that Districts were constituent bodies embraced within the International Union
and that locals were constituent bodies ambraced within
the Districts, does not in and of itself make either the
District or the local an agent of the International
Union. This circumstance, in and of itself, does not
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make the International Union answerable for the
actions of the District or of the local union. This point
came before the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344, 395. In that case,
Mr. Chief Justice Taft held that District organizations
were not agents of the national body and the national
body was not responsible for the actions of the District
organizations. He said in part: * * *
"'But it is said that the District was doing the work of
the International and carrying out its policies and this
circumstance makes the former an agent. We can not
agree to this in the face of the specific stipulation
between them that in such a case unless the International expressly assumed responsibility, the District
must meet it alone.'
"And again, he says:
" 'We conclude that the motions of the International
Union, the United Mine Woarkers of America, and
of its president, and its other officers, that the jury be
directed to return a verdict for them, should have been
granted.'
"That case, too involved the calling of a strike which
was claimed to have been in violation of law. The
action was brought under the Antitrust Act, but this
circumstance does not differentiate the decision from
the case at bar in principle.
"A more recent case was decided in the Fourth Circuit, in which the late lamented Judge Parker wrote
the opinion, United Construction Workers v. Haislip
Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 36 LRRM 2315. He there
held that the regional director of a union and its field
representative were not agents who could bind the
National organization.
"Plaintiff's counsel stresses the argument, however,
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that under the constitution of the International Union
and of the District, the president of the District organizaion is appointed by the president of the International Union. The mere fact, however, that officers
of a constituent body may be appointed or selected by
the head of the larger National organization does not
make the officers of the constituent body agents of representatives of the National body." (Emphasis ours.)
On July 24, 1958, the National Labor Relations Board
held in the case of Electrical Workers Union and Sherman P.
Rock, 42 LLRM 1301:
"The overwhelming weight of judicial authority,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, is
that a local union is a legal entity apart from its international and that it is not a mere branch or arm of
the latter. That too has been the position of the Board.
If the local in this case is merely an administrative
arm of the IBEW International, the Board has been in
error all these years in requiring that locals of the
IBEW as well as of other international unions comply
with the filing requirements of Section 9 (f), (g),
and (h) of the Act. And if locals are only 'administrative arms,' and not separate entities, they are probably
incapable of withdrawing from their internationals, as
for example when the internationals are ousted from
the AFL-CIO.
"Probably no international union regulates the affairs
of its locals more closely than does the United Mine
Workers, yet, beginning with the Coronado cases, the
Federal Courts have consistently refused to find that
locals of the Mine Workers are mere branches of the
International so as to make the latter automatically
responsible for the legal wrongs committed by the
locals.
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trative arm of its international, the latter's responsibility for any specific conduct of the former must be
determined by the ordinary rules of agency. Unless
Johnson, acting within the scope of his authority, participated in, ratified, or encouraged the continuation
of the strike, responsibility cannot be attributed to the
Respondent International. In this connection, the
authority of Johnson to ratify must rest on actual and
not apparent authority. 'Here it is not a question of
contract or of holding out an appearance of authority
on which some person acts. It is a mere question of
actual agency ... ' The Trial Examiner concluded that
Johnson did not have the authority to ratify the conduct of the Respondent Local. We agree with him.''
(Emphasis ours.)
We especially invite the Court's attention to a Utah case
in which the factual record is ten-fold stronger in behalf of
plaintiff than is the record in the case at bar and a case which
cities United Mine Workers vs. Patton, supra: Adamson
vs. United Mine Workers, 3 Utah 2nd 377, 277 P2d 922,
35 LLRM 2439. In that case there was evidence that one Harry
Mangus said he represented U.M.W. of A., the International,
and who said no more coal would be produced until the mine
was organized into the International, nor until the agreement
was signed by John L. Lewis, the President of the International,
and by the said Harry Mangus. The said Mangus delegated
Skinner and Rice to round up the men so that the mine could
operate the next morning, but because no dit"ect evidence was
put into the record that the International controlled the picket
line, this Court held there was no implied agency by ratification
and that the fact of authorization and ratification on the part
of the International as a matter of law was not proven; that
is to say, the indispensible fact, agency must first be proven
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directly, not upon implication before scope, authorization or
ratification may be established. This Court held:
"We believe that before the lower court could properly submit the question of agency to the jury, the
burden was upon plaintiff to present facts in evidence
which would sustain a verdict, and the evidence must
do more than raise a conjecture or surmise that the
ultimate fact is as allegei The Court in Toledo, St.
L. & W. R. Co. v. Howe, 191 Fed. 776, as quoted by
this court in Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Min. Co., 55 Utah
151, 184 P. 802, announced the rule as follows:
"It (the substantial evidence in support of a material
element) must be, as said Judge Severens, 'something
of substance and relevant consequence, and not vague,
uncertain, or irrelevant matter not carrying the quality
of "proof" or having fitness to induce conviction.' "

:fc

"Plaintiff contends that the very nature of organization of the International Union is a sufficient indication
of agency. However, plaintiff fails to define the scope
of the agent's authority, and, indeed, does not clearly
designate just who is or what constitutes the agent or
servant acting within the scope of his or its authority
and employment.
"Plaintiff's case is made no stronger by the authorities involving the International Union of the United
Mine Workers of America as a party. See United Mine
Workers of America v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 33
LLRM 2814; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, 75 S.E. 2d 694, 32
LRRM 2470. The evidence contained in those cases,
reviewed on appeal, serves by marked difference to
emphasize the absence of appropriate proof in plaintiff's case." (Emph asis ours.)
Pennsylvania Mining Company vs. United Mine Workers,
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28 Fed. 2nd 851. In this case, the facts respecting International
agency were at least as strong or stronger as they were in
the Coronado cases supra against the International. However,
the Court instructed a verdict in favor of the International.
Ford vs. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., September, 1957, 315 Pac. 299:
"But it is a recognized rule in cases involving labor
union locals, which are subordinate components of the
international unions but have a prescribed independence in the management of their internal affairs, that
the international will not be held liable for obligations
incurred or acts done by the local in the ordinary
conduct of the latter's affairs in the absence or participation in or ratification of those obligations or acts.
Seidner v. Fish, 131 Misc. 203, 226 N.Y.S. 411; DiMaio v. Local 80-A, United Packinghouse Workers of
America, 29 N. J. Super. 341, 102 A.2d 480."
Our learned adversaries make an attempt to respond to
our position by saying that Jack Annand was a trustee of Local
976 and there abruptly it drops the matter. Thus, a great void
is left open and all without an occupant-so what-without
something more in the record that statement is a mere meaningless recitation. The burden is theirs, not ours. However,
the record speaks for itself and affirmatively and definitely
shows the contrary, to-wit: that Local 976 is a completely
autonomous local union (Tr. 124-6), completely independent
of any other organization; that Jack Annand was President of
Joint Council 42, but had never been in Ogden in his life; had
never written a letter to Local 976; that Local 976 negotiated
and signed all of its contracts by and through its own officers.
There is no dispute of course that Local 976 members
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paid dues to the International and to the Western Dairy Employees Council, as some or all of them no doubt paid to the
Elks, Kiwanis, Republicans, Democrats or Presbyterians, but
certainly such dues-paying affiliation does not mean that such
membership could act for the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters without some grant or express authority any more
than they could act for the International organization of Elks,
Republicans, Democrats, Kiwanis, or Presbyterians. This
comparison may seem somewhat extreme; nevertheless it appropriately is illustrative of our adversary's position.
Generally, agency arises from an agreement expressed in
fact, wherein the agent is clothed with authority to do those
things and those things only that the principle can do. This
arises because the law of agency is perhaps an outgrowth of
the law of master and servant-for the acts of the servant in
the scope of his employment, the master is liable. Agency
generally can be revoked at any time but a trust may be revoked
generally only on termination of the trust. A mere trustee
cannot make the creator of the trust or a beneficiary of the
trust liable to third parties. So what Jack Annand or the Internation could, would or did do in attaching liability to or
through the Joint Council is completely unknown.
The record shows without dispute that Teamsters Local
Union 976 was a wholly autonomous organization (Tr. 124126), entirely emasculating any contention that some other
organization such as the Joint Council, the Western Conference
of Teamsters or the International could dictate, would dictate
or did dictate to this local union the manner in which its membership should run its affairs. And to make plaintiff's case
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doubly groundless, the record discloses here without dispute
that Teamsters Local Union 976 engaged in no picketing activities.
Little wonder then that the Trial Court said he had a
problem in this respect (Tr. 140) and pondered why the
International should be held responsible for the actions of the
Joint Council, who actually did the picketing, and expressing
his doubt from the bench.
A legion of practical illustrations lights up in one's mind
which would upset such an argument. Assume that the record
shows a local trustee case; that the secretary of the International
had authority to say to Jack Armand, "Teamsters Local Union
976 is not being run in the best interest of the membership;
they are continually fighting and quarreling among themselves. I want you to take over their money affairs, negotiate
and execute all unfinished and pending contracts for and in
the interest of the membership and give them all the advice
and assistance otherwise you can until such time as the matter
is straightened out." Whereupon, further suppose that the
membership decided to call a wildcat strike or breach a valid
existing contract while such matter is being straightened out
and then a suit for damages ensues. Under the present statute
and case law, the International would be manifestly exempt
from liability.
Assume further under such circumstances that Jack
Annand was given the above instructions and he got lost and
the local union wrongfully engaged in secondary activity. Likewise, the International could not be held responsible.
Assume further that Jack Annand after receiving such
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instructions decided not to interfere and the local union became
involved in actionable secondary activity, the International
would be exempt from such liability. Assume that the International had the authority and so delegated such authority to
Jack Annand and he came into Utah to personally visit indefinitely and notified the membership of the local that henceforth he was going to negotiate all contracts, collect and handle
all collections exclusively, always, of course for and in behalf
and in the name of the membership, until such time as the
membership ceased its quarreling and bickering and then proceeded to do just that. Whereupon, such membership promptly
said, "Nuts to you, Brother," and struck the big Weber Central
Dairy in breach of their contract and the Dairy sued the local
and the International for damages. Obviously under the statute
and the case law, no liability would attach to the International.

:r:

l''

When Jack Annand was appointed, if he was duly appointed, what authority he did or could exercise if any; what
his duties were if any; what authority he exercised if any; what
power the International could grant if any; what duties or
functions he performed if any; to what extent if any, the
functions he may have performed disturbed the traditional and
usual operation of the local union if any; are all left to the
imagination and we can't cross examine or serve a subpoena
on that and a fortiori, whether design or impotence, it makes
no difference, Local Union 976 very positively did no picketing.
The same sort of feeble attempt is made to compromise
Ballew in behalf of the International Union, wherein plaintiff
claims on Page 46 of its brief:
"It seems clear that Ballew on behalf of the Western
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Conference and for the Western Conference, as part
of the International Union, was in Utah for the specific
purpose of helping the local union and that he did so
... The Western Conference, the local union in Ogden,
and the International Union let its representative get
into a position where he could and did cause trouble
of the kind complained of in this lawsuit and therefore,
the local, the Western Conference, and the International are responsible for his acts under the statute
and the decisions construing it. (Emphasis ours.)
The above statement leaves us cold. In our opinion, it is
a downright unwarranted assumption in an attempt to detour
and pre-determine this appeal. The record shows without dispute that Ballew was not in the employ of the International,
nor under its direction, nor on its payroll, but on the other hand
was on the payroll of an entirely different organization, to-wit:
The Western States Dairly Employees Council (Tr. 126-141).
The record further shows that the International either could
or would not, and in any event did not exercise any supervision
or direction or control over Ballew. If we have a ticket on our
learned opposition's train of thought in this respect, it has
run past the station. They seem to make no attempt to attach
any liability whatsoever through and by the Joint Council.
Perhaps they know too well this cannot be done and this they
must if they prevail, because no one but the Joint Council
participated in the picketing and that was done personally
by and through the trustees of the Joint Council, namely,
Messrs. Lott and Rash. Ballew was on temporary loan and was
under the exclusive direction and jurisdiction of trustee Rash
(Tr. 125-6), who was not on the payroll of the International
or in no sense represented it in this matter. Hence, to claim
that the Joint Council was the agent of the International
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when the record shows without dispute and the fact is Ballew
had been the employee for over three and a half years of the
Western States Dairy Employees Council (Tr. 141), seems to
us to be rather incomprehensible.
We most seriously and earnestly submit that the plaintiff
has taken a position here respecting the International not only
at war and inconsistent with all of the applicable United States
Supreme Court decisions but also with the decision of the State
of Utah, supra, and all other circuit and district Federal applicable decisions that we can find.
WHEREFORE, we respectfully submit the International is
blameless and exempt from any activity herein mentioned on
the part of the Joint Council.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY.
We adopt in such behalf and respectfully refer the Court
to the applicable authorities and reasons set out under Point V.
At the outset hereof we invite the Court's attention to the
answer of the defendant, Western Conference of Teamsters,
wherein it expressly denies in Paragraph II thereof picketing
on the part of itself or Local Union 976, and in Paragraph VI
of the second defense in the answer of local Union 976, such
defendant denies that it picketed, but in its third defense, there
appears a statement attributing picketing on the part of said
local union which, of course, was an obvious oversight and
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inadvertence, because the picket signs (and they were apparently prepared in Salt Lake City), notwithstanding the
picket witnesses and other testimony established beyond any
question of doubt the identity of the party picketing the truck
which was the Council and not the local union.
If the Western Conference of Teamsters is to be here
found guilty of picketing the Gassner truck upon the theory,
as the Court implies, that it and other teamster organizations
are dues-paying affiliates of the International, then and in such
event the applicable Court decisions we have read, such as the
latest one from a sister western state, the Ford case, supra,
are inconsistent wherein it held that an International will not
be responsible for the acts of a subordinate in the absence of
ratification, etc., and that agency must exist in fact and the
mere fact that the International is interested in the acts done
by the subordinate does not make the International responsible.

To otherwise hold would mean that every time an American
local union engaged in actionable secondary activity, then in
such event, every city and state federation of labor, conference, council and international to which such local is a duespaying affiliate, and practically all local unions are required
to affiliate with one or more federations and councils-then
all such city, state and national federations and councils and
conferences would be responsible and liable and a wholesale
over-hauling of their structural organization would promptly
be in order.
The Western Conference of Teamsters, according to the
record, had no office or place of business in Utah. It neither
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hired nor employed employees in Utah. It either could not
or did not exercise any influence over the council or local respecting picketing aCtivities and of course it did not engage in
any picketing activities.

til

WHEREFORE, we submit in the first place that it was palpable error for the trial Court to submit the liability of the
Conference to the jury and in the second place, the verdict was
so grossly excessive as to amount to an emotional effusion
emanating from a biased and prejudiced jury.

POINT VII

iZ

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS EXEMPT FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE ACT.
The Western Conference of Teamsters is specifically exempt from the definition of a labor organization set out in
Section 2 ( 5) as follows:

:c:-

" ( 5) The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or of conditions of work." (Emphasis ours.)
As will be readily observed, the definition is limited. Congress expressly proscribed the definition so as to make sure
the numerous organizations in which employees and employers
do not bargain and participate are exempt, such as city and
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state federations of labor, industrial councils, dinner clubs,
etc., which daily deal with labor relations problems.
If the decision in the case at bar is to guide and control
future decisions in such respect, then it becomes one of great
and far-reaching importance and consequence because and by
reason of the fact it brings effectively under such definition
all such labor and other federations which must take heed
and direction because they have heretofore traditionally, intentionally and organizationally, and we might say with
meticulous exactitude, kept themselves aloof and out of the
uninvited and unwanted continuous employee-employer bargaining brawl. Their field, as a matter of common knowledge,
is policy and politics. The Utah State Federation of Labor, for
instance, is purely and simply a political arm of the American
Federation of Labor. All AFL local unions were required to
affiliate with one or more local federations of labor but said
local unions surrender no bargaining autonomy.
It is undisputed in this record that the Western Conference
of Teamsters not only engaged in no employee-employer bargaining but that it was not a labor (union) organization (Tr.
125-149, 145-9). This evidence is not challenged, not even
conjecture remained in the record for the jury to speculate
upon.
WHEREFORE, we submit the Western Conference of
Teamsters organization was expressly exempt from the Act.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE
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IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
BY THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A LICENSE OR
PERMIT TO CONDUCT ITS INTERSTATE HAULING
BUSINESS.
Mr. Gossner, the President and General Manager of
plaintiff, testified at some length about his operations in transporting property in interstate commerce. He was certain in
testifying that he did not have a permit or license to transport
property in interstate commerce. All of his testimony as to
those matters will be found in the Transcript, pages 81 to 84.
In order that the Court may readily have before it such testimony we have quoted all of such testimony in the Appendix
of this Brief. We especially direct the attention of the Court
to this part of his testimony.
"Q. As a matter of fact, you didn't have an interstate
commerce permit, did you?
A. We had no in teres tate commerce permit. We had
legal permits necessaryto operate on the highways.
To my know ledge we had all the permits necessary
we had to have to operate a corporation and perform the services that we were performing."
It would seem self-evident that such evidence does not
m the slightest degree support or tend to support a finding by
the jury that plaintiff had a license or permit to engage in
the transportation of goods in interstate commerce. The evidence is clearly to the contrary, in that Mr. Gossner, the President of plaintiff corporation, stated in clear, concise language
that plaintiff did not have such a license or permit. There is
no evidence showing or tending to show that plaintiff did have
such a license or permit.
55
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In light of the fact that the Court has held that there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that plaintiff
had a license or permit to engage in the business of transporting
goods in interstate commerce, it would seem necessary to conclude that the evidence shows that plaintiff at the time here
involved was a contract carrier, and as such required to have
a license or permit to engage in interstate transportation of
goods. Unless plaintiff was required to secure a permit or
license to conduct the business of transporting goods in interstate commerce, there, of course, was no occasion to secure
or attempt to secure a permit or license to engage in interstate
commerce. However, if we are wrong in assuming that the
Court held that the evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff
was a contract carrier at the time here involved, we have assigned as error the failure to so find, such assignment being
as follows:

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS A CONTRACT CARRIER AT THE
TIMES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY.
It will be seen from the testimony of Mr. Gassner which
was stricken that plaintiff probably picked up property it back
hauled not related to the business.
The testimony of Arnie Hansen, the bookkeeper, testified
concerning the back haul on pages 212 to 216 of the Transcript. In order to have such testimony readily available for
the Court we have quoted all of his testimony touching the
matter of hauling property for payment of freight in the Ap-
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pendix of this Brief. \Ve especially call the following to the
attention of the Court:
"Q. Can you tell how much was collected by reason
of hauling freight?
It

I:

A. No. I couldn't.
Q. How long do you think it would take you to come
with, say, a percentage figure giving the Court a
figure of the total amount that resulted from back
haul?
A. That would be hard to do; it is from 1952 and up.

k:

Q. How long would it take to do it for a one-year
period, say 1954?
A. Oh, it would take probably a week to do it."
POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS
NOT ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. CORBETT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL.
In connection with this point and Point No. IX, it will be
seen that if plaintiff had a license or permit to carry goods in
interstate commerce, then and in such case, it had a right to
carry goods upon which it made a charge for freight, and likewise the affidavit of Mr. Corbett would not aid the defense
of defendants. However, it is defendants' position that under
the facts disclosed by the record plaintiff, as a matter of law,
was a contract carrier as defined by U.S.C.A. Title 49, Sections
303, 304 and 309, and 311, 312, 315 and 322, referred to and
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in part quoted on pages 95 to 97, both inclusive, of our original
Brief. Especially is that true in light of the decisions by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited
and analyzed on pages 98 to 100, both inclusive, of our original
brief filed herein. We shall not reargue what is there said,
but adopt the argument there made in support of this petition
for a rehearing.
We make this additional observation in support of this
Petition for a Rehearing. It is a well-established rule of law
that where a law requires that a license or permit is necessary
to engage in a business that one who relies upon his right to
engage in such business must allege and prove that he has a
license or permit to engage in such business. See Rule 9 (c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It will be seen from the
reading of the fifth paragraph from the end of the opinion
that the Court assumed that the burden was on the defendants
to show that plaintiff did not have a license or permit. If such
is the holding of the Court, it is the contention of defendants
that the Court was in error in so holding. The burden is on
plaintiff to establish his case.
The Court held that the information contained in the
affidavit of Mr. Corbett was available to defendants during
the trial by way of discovery, or otherwise, and there is no
showing of their nonavailability. It is true that there were some
books kept by plaintiff's bookkeeper offered in evidence at
the trial. An examination of such books will disclose that they
are conspicuous for what they fail to show rather than what
is shown by such books. When Mr. Hanson was asked for
definite information as to the source of the income, he stated
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that it would require probably a week to supply such information for one year, say 1954. The defendants had a right to
assume that the plaintiff would produce and offer in evidence
its entire records, and not pick out only the portion thereof
which it deemed an aid to its claim for damages. The failure
of the plaintiff to produce such records together with the
testimony of its witness Hansen that it would probably take
a week to furnish information as to the source of income for
one year, made it necessary for defendants to bring the withheld facts before the Court by affidavit. The facts revealed by
the affidavit were timely made in conformity with Rule 60b ( 3),
which provides that the court shall "grant relief from a judgment for fraud whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party." As heretofore stated, if the evidence, contrary to defendants' contention supports a finding that the plaintiff had
a permit or license to engage "in the transportation of property" in interstate commerce, it may well be that the error of
the trial Court in refusing to permit the filing of the affidavit
of Corbett was not prejudicial, otherwise such affidavit gave
support to the claim that plaintiff was engaged in transporting
property in interstate commerce without having a right to
do so.

POINT XI
THE COURT ERRED BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT
THE BOOKS OF PLAINTIFF WERE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE AND PROPERLY SO RECEIVED, AND THAT AS
SUCH TENDED TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
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We have discussed this phase of the case on page 91-92
of the original Brief filed herein. We adopt without repeating
the argument there made in support of this Point in support
of our Petition for a Rehearing.

POINT XII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES WAS NOT SO SPECULATIVE
AS NOT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
The fact (if as defendants contend as a matter of law,
plaintiff was a contract carrier of property in interstate commerce without a permit or license) has a direct bearing on
defendants' claim that the evidence is so speculative and
uncertain that a verdict for damages is without support in
the evidence, if, in fact, plaintiff did not have a license or
permit to transport property in interstate commerce, there, of
course, would be one further element of speculation for the
jury to consider than there would be if plaintiff had such a
permit or license. On pages 95 to 97 we have directed the
attention of the Court to a number of the provisions of the
Federal Transportation Act. It will be seen that before a
permit to engage in interstate commerce may be granted, it
is necessary for the applicant to comply with the provisions
of the Act. It is also necessary for an applicant to establish
the necessity for an additional means of transportation. It
seems to be the uniform holding of the courts that one may
not recover damages for profits that might be made out of
a future undertaking. See 15 Am. Jur. 574, and numerous
cases cited in footnote 17. Not only does the evidence in this
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case have the frailty discussed in our original brief, but the
fact that plaintiff might at any time be enjoined from continuing his business because it did not have the required
permit, and may well have been unable to secure a permit.
Profits made by plaintiff at a previous time while engaged in
an unlawful business cannot be used as a standard for determining prospective profits. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore,
277 Fed. 694, 21 A.L.R. 1506. Nor may a finding be based
on surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation. It is a guess as
to whether or not plaintiff could secure a permit to engage in
interstate commerce. It is a guess as to how long plaintiff may
make a profit out of the transportation of property in interstate commerce, and it is a matter of conjecture and speculation
as to whether the Dormans were influenced to write the letter,
Exhibit P4, on account of what was told the Dormans, or on
account of any concerted action, if any, of Dorman's employees. That a Finding of Fact may not be sustained when
based on surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is the holding
of the courts generally and by this Court in such cases as
Higley v. Industrial Commision, 75 Utah 361, 285 Pac. 306;
Karren v. Blair, 63 Utah 344; 225 Pac. 1091; Dern Inv. Co.
v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 Pac. ( 2d) 660;
Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n of Mining Employees, 97 Utah 91;
89 Pac. ( 2d) 490. We adopt what is said under Point I at pp.
8-10 of this Brief in support of this Point.

POINT XIII
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY
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THE JURY THAT DORMANS REFUSED TO PURCHASE
MORE CHEESE BECAUSE OF THE PICKETING.
We again call to the attention of the Court the testimony
of Louis Dorman, a witness called by plaintiff, who on crossexamination testified that if a load of cheese were brought
from the Cache Valley Plant, either by Dairy Distributors or
common carrier truck or rail, Dormans would accept the same
(Tr. 336-7). The other evidence touching that phase of the
case is contained in Exhibit P -4 addressed to Cache Valley
Dairy, which was received in evidence over defendants' objection. On page 105 of defendants' original Brief will be
found a discussion of the claimed error in admitting such
letter. We urge the Court to reconsider this Petition for a
rehearing in light of the error in the admission of such evidence
as set out in the original brief of defendants above mentioned
and under the argument heretofore made in this Brief.
POINT XIV
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE A FINDING BY THE JURY
THAT THE DORMANS WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE
TO PURCHASE MORE CHEESE FROM THE PLAINTIFF.
Much of what has heretofore been said under Point XIII
is applicable to this Point. \\l e have this further observation.
It is indeed difficult to understand if Mr. Gossner, as President
of plaintiff corporation, was making the profits that it claims
to have been making, and if plaintiff had a right to engage
in carrying property in interstate commerce, why was not
something done to enjoin the defendants from interfering with
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plaintiffs operation? It is an elementary principle of law that
one who is or has been damaged by the unlawful acts of another must use all reasonable means available to minimize
the damage. If authorities are deemed desirable to support
such principle of law, numerous cases from state and federal
courts will be found collected in footnotes to the text in 25
C.J.S., Sections 32 to 36, pages 499 to 509. Among the cases
there cited are: Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 76 Utah 141, 287 Pac. 931; Jankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah
325, 54 Pac. (2d) 425. We adopt what is said under Point I
at p. 10 of this Brief in support of this Point.

POINT XV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
We refer the Court to the authorities heretofore cited in
support of this Point.

POINT XVI
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL.
It will be seen that in the Court below defendants moved
the Court to grant a new trial if it refused to grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.

The grounds upon which the Motion for a New Trial was
made are:
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1. Irregularities in the proceedings of the court by which

each of the defendants was prevented from having a fair trial.
2. Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.

3. Excessive damages given under the influence of passion
and prejudice.
4. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and
that the judgment rendered thereon is against law.
In our original Brief on page 106 under Point XIV we
have discussed the claim that the verdict is excessive. We
have heretofore called to the attention of the Court the fact
that the plaintiff offered in evidence only some loose leaf
books which were barren of all information of the source of
the income, and according to Mr. Hansen, the bookkeeper, it
would require a week to furnish such information for one
year.
As to the verdict being excessive, we again direct the
attention of the Court to what is said on pages 106 and 107
of defendants' original Brief.
So also was it manifest error to admit in evidence Exhibit
4. We have discussed that error on page 105 of our original
Brief.
For the reasons stated defendants submit that a rehearing
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE M. BECK,
A. PARK SMOOT, and
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorneys
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APPENDIX
Testimony of Mr. Gassner
Mr. Beck: Q. Now, Mr. Gassner, you said something
on cross examination respecting the back haul of
Dairy Distributors trucks being a very profitable
operation. I will ask you what was the nature of
your certificate to haul over the public highway long
line.
Mr. Hanson: May it please Your Honor, I object to
that question; we are getting far afield.
There was no issue raised in the pleading and
apparently Counsel has in mind he violated some
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation. There
was nothing in the pleading to this, and I object
on the ground it is a variance of cross-examination
and has no bearing on the issues here.
Mr. Beck: Counsel puts in something about a haul.
Mr. Hanson: There has been nothing with respect to
hauling, they admit we are a corporation.
The Court: Any question with respect to possible haul
would be pertinent. I don't think any questions
with respect to their conduct under any Interstate
Commerce Commission Permit is under the scope
of proper cross-examination, and for that reason the
objection is sustained.
Mr. Beck: I want to be frank with the Court and everybody else. I am asking a question precisely to ascertain what happened to his back hauls.
The Court: Why don't you ask that question. The objection is sustained.
Mr. Beck: Did you on your back hauls haul furnaces,
pianos, automobiles, parts, and articles of that
character?
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A. There may have been an occasional haul like that.
You understand it was under Interstate Commerce
Commission regulations, any trucking firm could
make an occasional pickup and pick up occasionally
something not related to their business. We could
have done that. I am not managing this corporation.
I did not line up the back hauls on it. We have been
checked by the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the National Labor since the Union put pressure
on us the last few years. We have had every agency
I know check our books and we have come out
pretty clean with the Interstate Commerce Commission too.
Mr. Beck: I move to strike the last answer. It is not
responsive.
The Court: The answer is stricken. It is not responsive.
The jury is to disregard it.

Q. You would have back hauls in the nature of furnaces, pianos, automobile parts and articles such as
those commodities ?
A. I don't know we ever did. I don't know whether we
did. I don't know when we closed. We closed
naturally after we went out of business.
Q. What were you hauling?

A. The chief back haul was calcium chloride. I think
that is the name for it. We picked it up-the Company picked it up in Ohio some place and just had
a representative here yesterday or the day before
checking why we were not picking it up again. That
was one of our major back hauls. Of course, the
Company purchased milk cartons in the state of
New York and brought them into this area.

Q. For whom were you hauling calcium chloride?
A. For Dairy Distributors, Inc., and Dairy Distributors
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sold it to different concerns in this Intermountain
area.
Q. You were m the merchandising business then, is
that it?
A. I would say so, yes.

Q. What is calcium chloride?
A. It is a by-product of chloride-of the chemical industry, just what exactly it is, what by-product it is
-it is a residue of another industry. It is a byproduct and it is used out in this country by the
manufacturers, or for retreads on tires and so forth,
and also used in road construction in the wintertime, that is, it is used in cement work and so forth
in the wintertime, in the summertime it is used to
settle dust on the highways to the best of my knowledge. That is what they use calcium chloride for.
We used it ourselves on dusty roads.
Q. How many times did you haul a load of calcium
chloride from Ohio?

r:.

A. Thirty or forty times. We have record available. I
don't know how many trips.
Q. Are they in these records?
A. The invoices were paid and so forth, and it will
show in there. You will find it in there.

Q. Did you haul calcium chloride pursuant to your
Interstate Commerce Commission permit?
A. We bought it and sold it out here, and to my
knowledge you can haul anything your ownself on
your own trucks.
Q. As a matter of fact you didn't have an Interstate
Commerce permit, did you?
Mr. Allen: Your honor please, we object to that, being
iii
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incompetent. It has nothing to do with the issue
in this case, it isn't pleaded. It is an attempt to cross
examine this witness on something that is immaterial.
The Court: That objection is overruled at this time.
Mr. Hanson: We object to going beyond the scope of
direct examination.
The Court: He may answer that question.
A. We had no Interstate Commerce Commission permit. We had legal permits necessary to operate on
the highways, to my knowledge we had all the permits necessary we had to have to operate a corporation and perform the services that we were
performing.

Q. N arne the permits you had.
Mr. Hanson: Your Honor please, it looks to me like
that is entirely beyond the scope of the direct examination.
Mr. Hanson: I know he has. I think we are getting far
afield.
The Court: I think it may have a bearing.
Mr. Hanson: I will withdraw the objection, if the Court
wants to hear it.
The Court: You may answer.

A. I said to my knowledge we had permits. I had nobody call to my attention we didn't have permits
to do the business we were doing. We had our
books and checks and nobody objected to the way
we were doing business and the license I had reference to, it was anover-the-road permit. In some
states you buy a permit to travel through the whole
year, that is the permit I have reference to.
iv
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Mr. Beck: Move the answer be stricken as not responsive.
The Court: It may be stricken.
Q. (By Mr. Beck): Will you answer the previous question?
A. I thought I answered it correct.
Q. The q~estion was "Name the permits you operated
under.
A. I can't name them.
Q. Did you have any permits ?
A. I didn't know we needed any more permits than
we had.
Q. Then your answer is you don't know, or you didn't
have, is that right?
A. I don't know.

Testimony of Arnie Hansen
Mr. Arnie Hansen testified in part as follows: (Tr. 212
to 216, both inclusive).
That he was bookkeeper for Dairy Distributors during the
time that it was engaged in business.
Q. As I understand they (Dairy Distributors) had
$35,000 when they opened business, started business and $30,000 when they ceased, by this report.
A. Yes.

~ro~

;el~

Q. A decrease of about $5000.00
A. Yes.

fr

1lf.'

Q. Did they pay any dividends during the time they
were in business ?

nceW·

v
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. No, sir.

Q. None at all?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, there has been some evidence here that certain goods were secured in the East?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the Company itself buy that, or merely carry
it here?
A. They bought it. It was in the regular course of business it was bought and resold.

Q. Can you tell us the amount they paid for goods they
bought?
A. It would vary.

Q. The total amount.
Q. Can you tell from your books how much you got
for it (goods) ?
A. I couldn't do it offhand. I could go to the books and
find it out.

Q. How long would it take to do that?
A. It would be quite a job because we haven't segregated the sales, whether coming or going sales to
us. I don't know what the sales or purchases have
been.

Q. You wouldn't attempt to testify to any portion of
this, if there was any portion, the amount hauled
on straight freight charge for hauling it?
A. There could have been a single case. I don't know.
Q. You couldn't tell?
A. I couldn't tell exactly, no.
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Q. Do you have an idea about it?
A. There might be something hauled we charged
straight freight for.
Q. Have you any judgment.
A. I couldn't offhand.

Q. Can you tell how much money was collected by reason of hauling freight?
A. No, I couldn't.
Q. Have you a judgment as to the percentage of the
property purchased in the East and hauled here
and re-sold ?
A. No, I don't.

Q. You don't have any judgment at all about that?
A. No, I don't.
Elias Hansen: I don't know how I can get any further
with the witness unless he can bring us some of this
information. That is the thing I am interested in.

Mr. Hanson: The books are here and available.
The Court: How long do you think it would take you
to come with, say a percentage figure, giving the
Court a figure of the total amount that resulted
from back haul?

A. That would be hard to do, it is from 1952 and up.
Q. How long woudl it take to do it for a one-year
period, say 1954?

A. Oh, it would take probably a week to do it.
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